FAQ: Iran’s New President and Latest ‘Election’

By Behnam Ben Taleblu

Q: Was Iran’s presidential contest free and fair?

Iran held snap presidential elections on June 28 following the May 19 death of President Ebrahim Raisi in a helicopter accident. The inability of any of the six candidates to attain more than 50 percent of the vote resulted in a July 5 runoff between the top two vote-getters: ultra-hardliner and former nuclear negotiator Saeed Jalili and so-called reformist parliamentarian and former Health Minister Masoud Pezeshkian.

Pezeshkian prevailed and is set to become the ninth president of the Islamic Republic following official endorsement by the country’s supreme leader on July 28. A swearing-in ceremony before parliament is scheduled for July 30.

The contest was a tightly managed process. Out of 80 potential applicants, the Guardian Council — a 12-person body composed of six clerics and six civil jurists directly or indirectly appointed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei — allowed only six candidates to run for president. All six candidates, including Pezeshkian, are loyal to Khamenei and committed to the revolutionary and Islamist governing ideology of the Islamic Republic.

Q: What does it mean that the election featured low turnout — does it reflect prospective voters’ efforts to discredit the regime?

On July 6, Iranian outlets claimed that Pezeshkian won the runoff election with an alleged 49.6 percent turnout — but this was a dubious figure given the pictures of empty polling stations from this contest and that the first round saw a reported 39.6 percent turnout, the lowest ever in the 45-year history of the Islamic Republic. Khamenei had previously called for a greater showing in the runoff to make up for a poor first-round performance. Iranian officials have since claimed the election cemented their regime’s self-styled status as a “democracy.”

Turnout in Iranian elections has dropped significantly since 2017 as anti-regime protests grew in scale and scope. Starting in 2018, Iranian protestors signaled their dissatisfaction with the entire political spectrum rather than a specific faction by chanting, “reformists, principalists, the game is over.”

Q: How is Khamenei using elections to defend his regime and ensure that lasting alternative power centers do not emerge?

Iran’s Guardian Council previously disqualified Pezeshkian from running for president in 2021, but in 2024, it paved his pathway to victory. Conversely, the same council has prohibited other and higher-ranking officials — such as former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or former Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani — from running for president. This oscillating approach offers Khamenei the ability to promote or demote factions and personalities based on what he believes would best secure the survival of the Islamic Republic at any given time.

This tendency to oscillate is also rooted in Khamenei’s desire to prevent any group from developing a hold on power that could even meaningfully challenge his own. Since Khamenei became supreme leader in 1989, every president — with the exception of the deceased Raisi — has served two terms. In their second terms, however, every president has had a falling-out with the supreme leader, particularly as they attempted to cultivate an independent political constituency and power base.

Q: Will Pezeshkian bring reform, or will he continue the policies of his predecessor?

Pezeshkian is no agent of change. In one interview, for example, Pezeshkian boasted about his role in working to mandate strict Islamic dress codes in hospitals and universities during the early days of the regime. Although Pezeshkian’s past and commentary belie it, he is widely styled as a reformist in the Western press. Accordingly, he and his ilk benefit from Western projection that hopes to read change into his agenda where it may not exist. The Iranian population has noticed this phenomenon, particularly those who participated in the 2022-2023 “Women, Life, Freedom” uprising against the regime and now feel slighted given the support they perceived they had from the West.

Khamenei has already directed Pezeshkian to continue the path and policies of Raisi, who was anything but reformist. In fact, Pezeshkian previously promised to continue in Raisi’s footsteps, a point he affirmed in a June interview by noting, “We are not going to write a new program and implement a new policy.” Pezeshkian did not campaign as an outsider or insurgent but rather as an implementer of the prevailing system. Iranian presidents are better understood as managers of Khamenei’s policies, with the authority to adjust tactics but not goals.

Q: What can we learn about Pezeshkian from his tenure at the Ministry of Health and time in Parliament?

During his tenure at the health ministry from 2001-2005, Pezeshkian survived an impeachment proceeding over low drug supplies and a reported slide in medical school standards. He also gained infamy for his actions following the death of Canadian-Iranian photojournalist Zahra Kazemi, who was tortured and killed by security forces after they arrested her in June 2003.

Pezeshkian was instrumental in leading the Iranian government’s botched response to and cover-up of the crisis, which included his prevention of foreign medical teams from engaging in their own separate investigation and rebutting claims by Kazemi’s family of torture. While serving in parliament in 2008, Pezeshkian defended a former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) officer and parliamentarian named Salman Khodadadi who was accused of rape and sexual violence.

Q: What are Pezeshkian’s views on the IRGC and the United States?

In 2019, Pezeshkian supported the decision by the IRGC to down a U.S. drone over international waters — an incident that nearly led to U.S. strikes on Iranian territory — and claimed the move “delivered a strong punch in the mouth of the Americans and proved to them that our country will not surrender.” Also in 2019, Pezeshkian, along with the rest of the Iranian parliament, donned the IRGC uniform when the body voted to label America as a terrorist state. He has more recently defended the move, claiming he would do so again.

In addition, in a post-election op-ed in The Tehran Times, Pezeshkian described IRGC Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, whom the United States assassinated in 2020 and who is responsible for killing hundreds of American soldiers, as a “global anti-terrorism hero.”

Q: Does Pezeshkian support Iran’s axis of resistance?

Since becoming president-elect, Pezeshkian has affirmed Iran’s stance as a supporter of Hamas and Hezbollah, terrorist groups that Iranians have rejected en masse through their street protests and slogans. In a call to Hamas chief Ismail Haniyeh, Pezeshkian pledged to continue supporting Palestinian terror groups until “Al Quds [Jerusalem] is liberated.” Pezeshkian has also held calls with Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad; Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Lebanese Hezbollah; and a senior Houthi official from Yemen.

Pezeshkian’s support for anti-Israel forces even extends to his praise of Western university students who have protested against Israel, trying to aid them by rejecting the charge that they are motivated by antisemitism.

Q: What Are Pezeshkian’s views on America’s great power competitors?

In his post-election op-ed in The Tehran Times, Pezeshkian wrote, “China and Russia have consistently stood by us during challenging times. We deeply value this friendship. Our 25-year roadmap with China represents a significant milestone towards establishing a mutually beneficial ‘comprehensive strategic partnership,’ and we look forward to collaborating more extensively with Beijing as we advance towards a new global order.” Pezeshkian also went on to praise Russia as a “valued strategic ally.”

Q: What are the implications of Pezeshkian’s presidency for the Iranian opposition?

Pezeshkian’s candidacy provides the Islamic Republic with the opportunity for a face-lift by elevating Iran’s ailing reformist faction to convey the false impression that Khamenei seeks or will even permit change. Public hostility to the regime intensified significantly during the 2022-2023 anti-regime protests that reached 150 cities, towns, and villages in Iran. Those protests followed a near half-decade of anti-regime demonstrations that helped push the domestic opposition and foreign diaspora towards a regime change consensus against the Islamic Republic.

Q: Will Pezeshkian tempt the West with diplomacy to buy time for Tehran’s nuclear ambitions?

Pezeshkian’s recent call for nuclear diplomacy aims to provide cover for Iran’s advancing nuclear program and deter or postpone international economic and political pressure. Such pressure may include the global “snapback” of UN sanctions pursuant to the 2015 nuclear deal, an option that expires in October 2025. Pezeshkian’s decision to enlist figures like former Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif in his campaign — and possibly others who worked in President Hassan Rouhani’s (2013-2021) government — aims to convey the impression that he seeks to follow in the footsteps of Rouhani, whose government negotiated the 2015 deal.

This comes at a time when Iran is growing its stockpile of enriched uranium and reportedly has engaged in weaponization-relevant studies.

Already, the promotion of Pezeshkian has facilitated a change in rhetoric from the European Union, with its spokesperson tweeting that the body is ready to resume “critical dialogue” with the Islamic Republic under Pezeshkian.