Amid hope for change, can Iran’s new President revive nuclear deal with West?

President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian and his likely foreign minister, Javed Zarif, are likely to pursue nuclear deal talks as it has the potential to unlock relief from a lot of misery and economic sanctions imposed on the Iranian people

By Col Rajeev Agarwal

In the recently held presidential elections in Iran, Masoud Pezeshkian beat Saeed Jalili through a runoff held on July 5, 2024, getting 16.3 million votes to Jalili’s 13.5 million. While there were expectations that a conservative hardliner like Jalili would prevail over the competition, the results of the first round of voting held on June 28 made this assumption doubtful as Pezeshkian garnered 42.45 per cent of votes, while Jalili came in second with 38.61 per cent.

With Masoud Pezeshkian becoming president, there is a definite change of guard, as the reformists have prevailed over the hardline conservatives. The election also puts an end to a turbulent period in Iran following the death of its former president, Ebrahim Raisi, in an unfortunate helicopter crash on May 19, 2024.

Masoud Pezeshkian, 69, is an ethnic Azeri Turk and a five-term parliamentarian who served as Minister of Health and Medical Education under reformist President Mohmmad Khatami from 2001–05. He is a cardiac surgeon by profession and has a more pragmatic and open world view as compared to many conservatives in Iran.

On the foreign policy front, he supports a ‘balanced foreign policy’ and insists on preserving Iranian and Persian pride while negotiating with the world on the basis of “dignity, wisdom, and expediency”. In his ‘message to the new world’, published on July 12, he stressed that his administration will be guided by a commitment to preserving Iran’s national dignity and international stature under all circumstances.

On relations within the region, he added that he will prioritise strengthening relations with the neighbours and champion the establishment of a “strong region” rather than one where a single country pursues hegemony and dominance over the others.

His main foreign policy advisor, Javed Zarif, who is largely tipped to be appointed the foreign minister, was also the FM under President Hassan Rouhani, Raisi’s predecessor, who had helped clinch the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).There is therefore obvious optimism that there could be some kind of breakthrough in the nuclear deal under the new regime.

What Happened to the Nuclear Deal?

The Iran nuclear deal, or JCPOA, was signed on July 14, 2015, after persistent efforts of diplomacy and negotiations over five years between Iran and P5 plus 1. It was an ‘instrument of faith’ between the two parties that incorporated strict checks and balances aimed at ensuring a strict vigil on Iran’s nuclear programme, lest Iran progress to developing a nuclear weapon.

At the same time, tough and crippling economic sanctions against Iran were revoked, giving Iran much-needed economic relief. Most importantly, Iran agreed to ‘anywhere, anytime’ inspections of its nuclear facilities by the IAEA and UN inspectors. On January 16, 2016, designated as Implementation Day, the IAEA verified that Iran had met all its nuclear-related commitments under the JCPOA, triggering the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

The hard work was soon undone as Donald Trump, who was strongly opposed to the deal and had called JCPOA a ‘horrible deal’, won the US presidential elections in November 2016 and immediately announced that he would impose “the highest level of economic sanctions” on Iran. And, on May 8, 2018, he pulled the plug on the nuclear deal. Despite concerted efforts by other members of P5 plus 1, the UN, and the IAEA, he did not relent, and Iran was pushed back into a strict sanctions regime.

Efforts to revive the nuclear deal commenced only after Joe Biden became US President in January 2021. The talks commenced in April 2021 and continued till January 2022, when the eighth round was concluded with the understanding that most of the technical issues had been agreed to and the deal was now possible within the parameters of ‘political decisions’. However, the Ukraine war broke out on February 24, 2022, and the Iran nuclear talks have been on the backburner since then.

The Current Status

While there has been no progress on the Iran nuclear talks for over two years now, the Iran nuclear programme has been progressing at a rapid pace. It may be recalled that, forced by unilateral withdrawal from the nuclear deal by the US and other punitive actions, including re-imposing tough economic sanctions, designating Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation on April 8, 2019, and the assassination of IRGC Commander Qasem Soleimani by US drone on January 3, 2020, Iran recommenced uranium enrichment on December 2, 2020, to enrichment levels of 20 percent purity. A few months later, on April 13, 2021, soon after a cyberattack on the Natanz nuclear plant, Iran announced that it would enrich uranium to 60 per cent, which it has continued since then.

In January 2023, an IAEA report raised alarm when its inspectors discovered that two cascades of IR-6 centrifuges at the Fordo nuclear plant in Iran had been configured in a way “substantially different” from what had been previously declared. The samples collected showed particles up to 83.7 percent enriched uranium, very close to 90 percent required for weapon grade uranium. Iran dismissed the concerns, stating that in the process of enrichment, small particles do get highly enriched.

There were reports of Iran slowing down its enrichment in August 2023 when the US and Iran were in indirect talks for a prisoner exchange, but following the outbreak of wear in Gaza in October 2023, Iran has increased the pace and is enriching uranium to 60 per cent, at a scale of 9 kg per month. Most of this high enrichment is taking place at its Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP) in Natanz and the Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP), which is dug into a mountain.

As per the IAEA report of May 2024, Iran’s total enriched uranium stockpile was 5,841 kilogrammes, of which Iran had an estimated 142.1 kilogrammes of uranium enriched up to 60 per cent purity. By the IAEA’s own theoretical definition, around 42 kg of uranium enriched to 60 per cent is required to make the required amount of highly enriched (beyond 90 per cent) enriched uranium for one nuclear bomb. By this calculation, Iran already has the required enriched uranium to make weapon-grade uranium for three bombs.

Options and Possibilities

When examining the possibilities of the revival of the nuclear deal, there are a few important issues to be examined. Firstly, it was a unilateral move by the US that led to the revocation of the nuclear deal, not any provocation or violation of the deal by Iran. In fact, despite the US pulling out of the deal in May 2018, Iran continued compliance with the terms of the deal until March 6, 2019, the last time that the IAEA reported that Iran was implementing all its nuclear-related commitments. It was only after the US designated the IRGC of Iran as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation on April 8, 2019, that Iran started enriching uranium again.

Secondly, in the eight rounds of talks on the deal since April 2021, Iran has reportedly agreed to most terms regarding the rollback of enrichment. It has, however, sought a sovereign assurance that the US will not unilaterally revoke the deal in the future and, secondly, that the US should remove the IRGC from its list of foreign terrorist organisations. On both issues, the US is not ready to concede. There is also an issue regarding Iran’s rapidly advancing ballistic missile programme that the US wants to be reined in and included in the deal, for which Iran is not ready, calling it extraneous to the scope of the nuclear issue.

Thirdly, the issue of changing dynamics in the region too has direct implications for Iran wanting a nuclear weapon and, hence, its effect on a possible deal. Since March 2023, there has been a wave of reconciliation in West Asia, triggered by the Saudi-Iran peace deal brokered by China.

Iran’s suspected desire to secretly weaponise its nuclear programme was based on its animosity and rivalry with its neighbours in the region, besides, of course, Israel. Following the reconciliation in the region, if Iran is no longer enemy No. 1, a large part of the motivation to have a nuclear weapons programme therefore gets dissipated. Although it is premature to say that Iran would be accepted as a trustworthy partner in the largely Sunni Arab world, new emerging dynamics may be beneficial to Iran in the long run.

To add to it, the ongoing war in Gaza and the brief military spat between Israel and Iran in April 2024 have shown the world the potent and punitive military capability that Iran possesses and that it is more than capable of taking on any threat with conventional military capability too.

Fourthly, the big question is: Does Iran require a nuclear weapon? The answer presently is ‘no’. Even President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian, in his ‘message to the new world’ on July 12, said that Iran’s defence doctrine does not include nuclear weapons and urged the US to learn from past miscalculations and adjust its policy accordingly.

Even the Supreme Leader Khamenei has repeatedly stated that it is “haram”, or forbidden in Islam, to develop a weapon like a nuclear bomb. Also, if and when Iran does announce its nuclear weapon capability, it could change and roll back years of efforts of reconciliation in the region, as others in the region like Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, etc may be forced to acquire nuclear weapons too and set off a weapons race, which is not at all in Iran’s interests. It may therefore prefer to maintain a level of ‘nuclear latency’, just below the threshold of a declared nuclear weapons programme.

Chances of a Revival?

President-elect Masoud Pezeshkian and his likely foreign minister, Javed Zarif, are likely to pursue nuclear deal talks as it has the potential to unlock a relief from a lot of misery and economic sanctions imposed on the Iranian people. However, whether they would be able to push it beyond the status attained at the end of the eight rounds of talks in January 2022, when most of the technical issues were agreed to and the deal was within the parameters of ‘political decisions’, is a big question.

Also, the US presidential election cycle is underway, and to think that the Iran nuclear issue could find focus and priority at the end of the current presidency is very unlikely. The ongoing war in Gaza and the resultant US support for Israel, as opposed to Iran’s support for Hamas and Hezbollah, is also a major dampener in any early talks between the US and Iran.

The real possibility of Donald Trump winning the presidential elections in November could be the final nail in any future possibility of nuclear deal talks, as it was Trump who, in the first place, revoked the deal unilaterally in May 2018. The road towards the nuclear deal therefore looks tough, and factors opposing it seem to outrank the hopes of a revival.

Col Rajeev Agarwal is a military veteran and West Asia expert. During his service, he has been Director in Military Intelligence as well as Director in the Ministry of External Affairs. His X handle is @rajeevidsa. Views expressed in the above piece are personal and solely those of the author. They do not necessarily reflect Firstpost’s views.