Iran loses control of the Houthis

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is trying to boost support for the Yemeni rebels and rebuild the ‘axis of resistance’

by Afshin Madadi

Iran has lost control of the Houthis in Yemen and is struggling to hold together what is left of its “axis of resistance” forces around the Middle East, Iranian officials say.

The officials have described how the rebels in Yemen, who regularly attack global shipping lanes, have stopped taking orders from Tehran.

“The Houthis have gone rogue for a while and are now really rebels,” a senior Iranian official told The Telegraph from Tehran. “They do not listen to Tehran as much as they used to.”

The official added: “It’s not just the Houthis – some groups in Iraq are also acting as if we never had any contact with them.”

The Houthis are Iran’s last remaining significant proxy force after Israel destroyed Hezbollah’s top command and what remains of Hamas was cut off by the siege of Gaza.

A senior Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander from Iran arrived in Sanaa, the Yemeni capital, last week in an attempt to bring the Houthi rebels back under Tehran’s control, The Telegraph understands.

Part of the IRGC’s plan to appease the rebels and rebuild the “axis of resistance” around them is to boost support for the Yemeni rebels after a months-long lull.

After the war with Israel, Iranian officials are increasingly reliant on their remaining assets in the region: select militia groups in Iraq and the Houthis in Yemen.

For decades, the clerics in Tehran waged massive propaganda and military campaigns portraying Iran as the chief defender of the Palestinian cause.

But they didn’t attend the Gaza ceasefire talks in Sharm el-Sheikh, because, as Iranian officials admitted: “They know they’ve lost the game.”

On the Iraqi militias, one Iranian official said: “They were told several times to not even hold training sessions for a while until things calmed down, but they do not listen either.”

The crisis with Iran’s proxies represents a fundamental shift in the regime’s regional posture, forcing Tehran to confront the collapse of a four-decade strategy built on projecting power through proxy forces rather than direct military engagement.

In Yemen, the Houthis have survived years of strikes and become adept at hiding their military equipment.

They have also broadened alliances and supply lines to try to wean themselves off support from Iran in recent months.

Mahmoud Shehrah, a former Yemeni diplomat, told The Telegraph: “The Houthis don’t need someone to encourage them. This is about the Houthis’ beliefs and they have their literature and their narratives.”

He added: “But we don’t ignore the co-ordination with Iran and the support and the smuggling and technology transfer from Houthis, from Iran to Sanaa. Houthis, they already have their own motivation to escalate.”

The Houthis’ rift with Iran goes back to April, when Tehran failed to come to their aid during heavy US strikes over fears of being drawn into direct conflict with America.

Since the Hamas-led Oct 7 attacks on Israel in 2023, however, the group has improved their tactics and missile capabilities and built a strong public image.

They control Sanaa, print money, collect taxes, divert aid, smuggle drugs, sell weapons to terror groups in Africa and disrupt international shipping routes in the Red Sea.

They also have a geographic advantage. Yemen’s mountainous terrain, similar to Afghanistan, helps them hide stockpiles of missiles and drones in caves and underground.

The IRGC dispatched a senior commander back to Yemen last week to address what Yemeni opposition media describe as a leadership crisis within the Houthis.

Abdolreza Shahlaei, commander of the Quds Force, an elite unit within the IRGC, returned to Sanaa after previously being recalled to Iran.

“The Houthis are currently facing a crisis of options and priorities, pressing internal challenges, and a complex regional landscape,” a recent report in Defense Line, a Yemeni military affairs platform, said.

The report added that IRGC personnel and experts assisting the Houthis “do not fill this strategic void” and are “essentially an extension and reflection of the confusion that exists in Tehran”.

Shahlaei is one of the IRGC most enigmatic commanders. The United States has set a $15m (£11.4m) reward for information on his network and activities.

The Iranian official who spoke with The Telegraph said one of Shahlaei’s plans was to urge the Houthis to “co-operate more than before since they are the only functioning group remaining”.

The American-led campaign of air strikes, that Mr Trump claimed had “decimated” the Houthis, was less effective than the president might have boasted, experts said.

A two-year campaign of strikes conducted under Joe Biden, the former US president, and then Mr Trump is estimated to have cost at least $7bn.

The Houthis had already weathered years of air attacks from Saudi-led forces and had become used to hiding their weapons to conduct mobile hit-and-run strikes.

Dr Bader Al-Saif of the University of Kuwait said co-operation benefited both Iran and the Houthis.

He said: “There is benefit for both Iran and Houthis to work together, and they have been. But I think they also have divergent interests, and they’ll carry their own interests when they see fit, whether in Iran’s case or in the Houthi case. Think of it as a kind of franchise.”