BY Bobby Ghosh

Don’t expect Tehran to give up the means of imposing more insult and injury upon Riyadh. 

Every long-time follower of geopolitics knows that a détente between old enemies is usually accompanied by the announcement of mutual benefit for all involved — this is the “Everyone wins!” explanation. Soon thereafter come assertions by each party of having gained special advantage from the bargain — this is the “We win the most!” defense, most vociferously argued by the side that gained the least.

Then come corollary claims that actors not involved in the agreement are somehow losing out — call it the “Neener-neener!” conclusion.

And so it is with the recent deal struck between Iran and Saudi Arabia, in which both sides agreed to the reopening of embassies and pledged to work together for regional peace. The agreement was superintended by China, marking a departure from Beijing’s long reluctance to involve itself in foreign frictions. Spin doctors for all three are diligently asserting that their side is reaping maximum benefit at minimum cost.

The Chinese case is that the deal demonstrates its growing superpower diplomatic clout, while showing up the limitations of its adversary, the US. The Saudis argue that their leader, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, has displayed sagacity and statesmanship in agreeing terms with Iran: The deal will allow him to focus on his ambitious economic agenda for the kingdom, and to extricate himself from his failed war in Yemen. And, into the bargain, it will put those sanctimonious Americans in their place.

In the Islamic Republic, the deal is being portrayed as a defeat not only for the US but also as an end-run around Israel’s efforts to bring the Saudis into the framework of the Abraham Accords.

Each of those claims has enough logic to appeal to the credulous. But none of them holds up to scrutiny. The agreement, long on promise and short on action, is scarcely a triumph of diplomacy. China made little contribution to the negotiations, but by putting its imprimatur on the deal Beijing has the onerous responsibility of keeping the signatories from going for each other’s throat. The US has little to lose and the Saudis have not foreclosed on the Abraham Accords.  

Regardless, Iran has the only real bragging rights to come out of the deal, a rare foreign-policy success for a regime seeking to break out from isolation. The theocrats in Tehran will feel vindicated in their decades-old policy of intimidation against its principal Middle Eastern rival. The bottom line is that the Saudis surrendered to a sustained campaign of harassment by Iranian proxies, the most potent of them being the Houthi militia in Yemen — and to threats by the Islamic Republic itself, the most potent of them being its nuclear program.

Having brought its old enemy to its knees by these means, Iran is unlikely to ease its grip on the Saudi jugular. Tehran has promised to suspend its supply of arms to the Houthis, but it has little interest in allowing Riyadh to rest easy about the threat from the south. Iran is more likely to encourage the Houthis to draw out any negotiations toward a Saudi withdrawal, and to hold out for terms that heap humiliation on Prince Mohammed.

Nor should the Saudis expect any easing of the threat from the north: Iran’s proxy militias in Iraq, having already fired missiles and drones deep into the kingdom, will remain armed and dangerous, and ready to be activated whenever it suits Tehran.

Riyadh knows that it will take a great deal more to placate the Iranians into keeping the peace. Hence, Finance Minister Mohammed al-Jadaan is talking up the prospects of Saudi investments in Iran: This could happen “very quickly,” he says. That he feels compelled to make promises he can’t keep — few Saudi investors will dare to run the gauntlet of US sanctions — smacks of desperation.

Will Tehran accept compensation in kind? The Saudis have little to offer on the diplomatic front. The kingdom’s leadership of the Gulf Cooperation Council is of little use to Iran, which already has relations with the other members. Riyadh has limited clout in the United Nations and other multilateral bodies. And its relations with the Biden administration, even if they were not strained, would not serve the Islamic Republic’s purposes.  

For the moment, in the absence of more tangible benefits, Iran will have to settle for Saudi submission and humiliation. Nobody should expect the regime to give up the means of extracting more of both.