The Bagram Factor: US Posturing and the Future of Iran’s Regional Integration

by Silvia Boltuc

Executive Summary

This report assesses Iran’s developing strategic posture amid renewed geopolitical encirclement, with a focus on the implications of a potential US return to Bagram airbase, regional infrastructure realignments, and shifting alliances in South and Central Asia.

It shows how external pressures, including snapback sanctions, Israeli strikes, and NATO containment strategies, increasingly constrain Tehran’s efforts to expand influence northward, via Armenia and Central Asia.

The “Trump Route” threatens to cut Iran’s access to the South Caucasus, while a possible US redeployment to Bagram would significantly hinder Tehran’s integration into Central Asia and expose Chinese Belt and Road Initiative corridors to greater risk.

The interplay of these factors, coupled with improved US-Pakistan relations and strained US-India ties, could push Iran towards a more security-focused and less flexible foreign policy, increasing the risks to regional stability and the contest for global influence.

Key Takeaways

1. Iran’s historical and economic drive to expand northwards is challenged by infrastructure, such as the “Trump Route,” which may cut off its regional connections.

2. A potential US return to Bagram airbase, coupled with recalibrated US–Pakistan relations, would significantly impede Tehran’s integration into Central Asia and complicate Chinese Belt and Road Initiative logistics.

3. Renewed sanctions, Israeli strikes, and NATO containment policies, alongside domestic disillusionment with Western diplomacy, are likely to push Tehran toward a more securitised foreign policy, undermining prospects for regional stability.

Information Background

Iran’s strategic opening to the north is rooted in both necessity and historical continuity. Once part of Persia, the Caucasus and Central Asia represent natural extensions of Iran’s geopolitical space. Armenia provides Tehran with a vital gateway to the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) markets, while Central Asian republics, once marked by mistrust and frozen diplomacy in the 1990s, have become preferential partners in the Supreme Leader’s “look to East” doctrine.

Relations with Afghanistan have been equally significant. Despite not recognising the Taliban government, Tehran has pursued pragmatic engagement to foster regional stability, including the creation of special economic zones along the border to boost bilateral trade. Challenges persist, however, including migration pressures, Islamic State targeting Iran, disputes over the Helmand River, and tense relations with Taliban leadership.

Geopolitical Scenario

The geopolitical encirclement of Iran is intensifying. The Israeli and US strike and ensuing 12-day war not only disrupted Iranian leadership but also transformed public attitudes, fostering distrust toward negotiations with the West. This shift coincides with critical developments:

1. JCPOA Snapback Mechanism – The threatened reactivation of sanctions exacerbates economic and political pressure on Iran, undermining ongoing negotiations despite President Pezeshkian’s reformist mandate. Despite Tehran’s continued participation, Israeli strikes that targeted both nuclear infrastructure and civilian neighbourhoods—with hundreds of civilian casualties—eroded public trust. Accusations that the IAEA leaked sensitive information to Israeli intelligence have further undermined confidence. European responses, including German Chancellor Merz’s praise of the Israeli operation, have reinforced Iranian perceptions of Western hostility.

2. Domestic pressures are also mounting. A letter issued several months ago by roughly 70 Iranian parliamentarians—urging the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) to reassess Iran’s established nuclear and military doctrine in response to the 12-day war and European coercion through snapback sanctions—has recently resurfaced. The E3 coercive approach has worsened the public reaction.

3. The “Trump Route” – The planned corridor connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan through Armenia would sever Iran’s access to the South Caucasus, severely restricting its regional connectivity. Moreover, it might offer the possibility of US personnel deployment along Iran’s border for the next 99 years.

4. US Possible Return to Bagram – Bagram airbase, strategically located 60 km north of Kabul, provides the US with a platform for reconnaissance and rapid deployment toward Iran’s eastern provinces. While Iran is not necessarily the primary target, Bagram threatens both Iranian integration into Central Asia and Chinese interests, including the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Its proximity to Xinjiang and the Wakhan corridor heightens Beijing’s vulnerability.

   
   

   The potential US redeployment to Bagram is reinforced by a recalibration of US–Pakistan relations. On 19 June 2025, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Asim Munir, was formally received by President Trump in Washington—the first time an incumbent Pakistani army chief was hosted at the presidential level.

   
   

   Dialogue on counter-terrorism is intensifying, with discussions between Pakistan’s Interior Minister Mohsin Naqvi and Acting US Counterterrorism Coordinator Gregory LoGerfo, as well as financial consultations in Washington.

   Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif is expected to meet US President Donald Trump on September 25, during the sidelines of the UN General Assembly. These developments indicate a broader US containment strategy targeting China, with Iran as a secondary concern. The shift also reflects deteriorating US–India ties, suggesting an American effort to balance against New Delhi as well.

   
   

Broader US motivations include:

• Russia’s recognition of the Taliban’s Emirate, prompting reconsideration of US presence in Afghanistan.

• Trump’s modest achievements nearly one year into his presidency, including failure to secure peace in Ukraine, only a fragile pre-agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and controversial projects such as the “Trump Riviera” in Gaza. Renewed focus on Afghanistan may serve as a distraction for internal audience ahead of the 2026 midterm elections.

• Recent US counter-terrorism warnings regarding possible al-Qaeda attacks on US soil, potentially justifying renewed engagement in Afghanistan. While the unpredictability of Trump’s administration makes a US return uncertain, such a move would significantly impede Iran’s integration into Central Asia, a trajectory further consolidated by its participation in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, infrastructures such as the recent inaugurated Sino-Iranian railway linking Xi’an to the Aprin dry port, aimed at strengthening transport corridors between China and Iran through routes deliberately insulated from US pressure—unlike the Strait of Malacca, which remains the primary channel for China’s hydrocarbon imports from the Islamic Republic.

• NATO Containment of China and Russia – Western policies targeting Beijing and Moscow also constrain Iran’s external manoeuvrability, given its alignment with both powers.

Conclusion

Iran faces a precarious strategic environment marked by renewed encirclement, shifting alliances, and increasing domestic disillusionment with negotiations. While capable of withstanding renewed European sanctions, the arms embargo poses a significant challenge.

Mitigation may come through deeper coordination with China, Russia, and India, which remain aligned against Western containment strategies.

The convergence of US military repositioning in Afghanistan, evolving US–Pakistan ties, and the restrictive effects of the “Trump Route” signal a tightening geopolitical vise around Iran.

Coupled with the psychological and political impact of the Israeli attack, these dynamics risk pushing Tehran toward harder security and nuclear policies, weakening prospects for diplomacy and potentially escalating regional instability.

Silvia Boltuc

SpecialEurasia Co-Founder & Managing Director. She is an International affairs specialist, business consultant and political analyst who has supported private and public institutions in decision-making by providing reports, risk assessments, and consultancy. Due to her work and reporting activities, she has travelled in Europe, the Middle East, South-East Asia and the post-Soviet space assessing the domestic dynamic and situations and creating a network of local contacts. She is also the Director of the Energy & Engineering Department of CeSEM – Centro Studi Eurasia Mediterraneo and the Project Manager of Persian Files. Previously, she worked as an Associate Director at ASRIE Analytica. She speaks Italian, English, German, Russian and Arabic. She co-authored the book Conflitto in Ucraina: rischio geopolitico, propaganda jihadista e minaccia per l’Europa (Enigma Edizioni 2022).