The Uncontainable Consequences of a War with Iran

Rising tensions between the United States, Iran, and Israel put the GCC and Türkiye on the front lines of a conflict with far-reaching security, economic, and geopolitical consequences.

by Dr. Ali Bakir

The prospect of a renewed war against Iran has shifted from an abstract hypothetical scenario to a serious concern, following recent U.S. military deployments in the region and statements from U.S. officials indicating that serious negotiations with Iran have yet to begin. This situation reflects the convergence of unresolved dynamics involving Israel’s regional ambitions, Iran’s strategic miscalculations, and a fragile regional order struggling to avoid systemic collapse. For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Türkiye, a war against Iran would not be a distant or containable conflict; it would be a disastrous shock with direct security, economic, and political consequences.

The Drivers of Escalation: Israel, the United States, and Iran

At the center of this escalation is Israel’s unfinished business with Iran. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, despite unprecedented domestic polarization and sustained regional backlash, remains politically committed to completing what he defines as Israel’s strategic mission against Tehran. Israel’s expansive and increasingly overt hegemonic agenda, following the devastating war on Gaza, has placed it on a collision course with an emerging regional configuration led by Türkiye and Saudi Arabia that does not favor Israeli dominance.

From the Israeli perspective, a weakened or collapsed Iranian regime, replaced by one openly aligned with Tel Aviv, would fundamentally alter the regional balance and undermine the growing strategic convergence between Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. From this perspective, Iran is not merely a security threat, but an opportunity to reshape the region in Israel’s favor.

The United States enters this equation from a different angle. Trump’s posture toward Iran appears shaped by the assumption that the limited U.S. military action against Tehran in 2025—reportedly restraining Israel from further escalation—should have brought Iran to the negotiating table. That expectation did not materialize until February 2, which left Trump compelled to pressure Iran into negotiations—and conspicuously left the region open to the possibility that he could resort to force if negotiations fail.

Tehran, for its part, appears to have reverted to familiar patterns of behavior, suggesting that it either misread the intent behind U.S. pressure or concluded that concessions would accelerate, rather than prevent, regime vulnerability. Following its poor performance in the June 2025 “12-Day War,” Tehran has moved to revive its regional proxy networks, reinsert deeply polarizing and problematic sectarian figures into Iraqi politics, resist serious diplomatic engagement despite regional mediation efforts, and reportedly recruit intelligence assets inside countries actively working to prevent a U.S.–Iran war, including Türkiye. Collectively, these actions reinforce the perception that Iran has drawn the wrong conclusions from its defeat last year.

The Risks of Uncontained Conflict

These dynamics significantly increase the likelihood of a new war—and one that could be very different from previous conflicts. Iran today is weaker, more isolated, and more constrained than it was even last year, but it is also more desperate. If faced with a full-scale attack that threatens regime survival, Tehran would have little incentive to exercise restraint or think rationally.

Rather than calibrated escalation, Iran’s military would likely shift into a form of suicidal aggression, launching whatever capabilities remain at its disposal before they are destroyed. Actions that would have previously been unthinkable due to risk of escalation—the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, indiscriminate missile launches across multiple theaters, maritime terrorism, and activation of dormant or semi-dormant proxy cells—would become rational options for a regime that believes it has nothing left to lose. Unless the potential offensive is an unconventional operation aimed at leadership decapitation or internal regime transformation—without overt ownership—the Iranian response to a full-scale war would likely be region-wide and unconstrained.

Gulf Restraint and Strategic Caution

It is within this context that the positions of the GCC states and Türkiye must be understood. Notably, Gulf capitals have refrained from the kind of public commentary on Iran’s internal situation that characterized earlier periods of unrest. This restraint reflects a convergence of pragmatic considerations rather than indifference. Concurrent intra-Gulf tensions, particularly between Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have absorbed political bandwidth and elevated internal strategic competition over external confrontation. At the same time, Israel’s unprecedented claims of actively fueling instability inside Iran have introduced a complicating factor, making Gulf states wary of being viewed as aligned with Israeli efforts to engineer regime change in Tehran.

Equally important is the fact that recent de-escalation and normalization between Saudi Arabia and Iran have served tangible interests on both sides. Gulf states have little incentive to provoke Tehran in ways that could unravel these fragile arrangements, especially when the identity and orientation of any potential successor regime in Iran remain deeply uncertain. Moreover, there is no guarantee that regime collapse in Iran as a result of internal unrest or an external offensive would produce a more cooperative government; it could just as plausibly yield a more radicalized or fragmented outcome, spawning a security nightmare for the other Gulf nations. For this reason, out of concern that war would carry catastrophic regional implications, the GCC—especially Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman—have focused their diplomatic energy on urging Washington to avoid military action.

Among the most acute concerns is the Strait of Hormuz. Closing the strait would create severe consequences for Gulf oil exporters, especially Qatar and Kuwait. Even a temporary closure would trigger a global energy and financial shock, the severity of which would depend on duration but would be destabilizing in any case. Beyond global markets, the militarization of the Gulf would directly implicate GCC states hosting U.S. military bases—notably Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Saturation attacks on missile defenses or infrastructure would inevitably widen the theater of operations, dragging Gulf countries from reluctant stakeholders into active participants, regardless of their intentions.

The Security Costs for Türkiye

Türkiye’s position is more explicit and openly oppositional to war against Iran. Ankara has consistently warned that a military confrontation with Tehran would not be geographically or politically containable. Such a war would undermine painstaking efforts to stabilize Syria and Iraq, reopening fault lines that have only recently begun to narrow. It would further destabilize the Gulf’s economic and security environment, amplifying shocks that Türkiye would feel through trade, energy markets, and financial flows. Perhaps most concerning for Ankara, a war against Iran would significantly empower Israel’s already expansionist posture, consolidating its freedom of action at a moment when Türkiye sees regional balance, not dominance, as the key to long-term stability.

In a case of total war, Türkiye would also face its own direct humanitarian and security consequences. As a primary destination for populations fleeing Iran, it would likely confront a large influx of Iranian refugees, adding to existing demographic, economic, and social pressures. At the same time, the activation of Iranian networks or spillover violence could create new internal security challenges, making neutrality functionally impossible, even if Ankara avoids direct military involvement.

In short, a total war against Iran would represent a disastrous scenario for the region. The key question is whether Iran will learn the right lessons from its defeat in 2025 and choose to avoid war by making prudent decisions, or whether it will opt for a self-destructive path, dragging the entire region into conflict along with it. Similarly, the final outcome will depend on how the United States manages Israel’s role in any confrontation with Iran—and whether the Gulf can avoid a war that exclusively serves an Israeli agenda at the expense of broader regional security.

Issue: Geopolitics

Country: GCC, Iran

Dr. Ali Bakir

Ali Bakir is a Research Assistant Professor of International Affairs, Security, and Defense at Qatar University. He is also a Senior Non-Resident Fellow at the Atlantic Council, “Scowcroft Middle East Security Initiative” and Middle East program. His work focuses on the foreign, security, and defense policies of the Gulf countries and Türkiye, as well as Türkiye-Arab/Gulf relations, Gulf security, great power competition in the Middle East, the behavior of small states, and the geopolitics of the MENA region and the Eastern Mediterranean.  He had his education, fieldwork, and work experience in several countries, including Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Turkiye, and Qatar. He is available on X @alibakeer