Trump must not repeat Bush’s Iraq mistakes in Iran

by Reza Nasri

In his seminal book “The Achilles Trap,” Steve Coll offers a meticulously documented account of how mutual misperceptions, intelligence failures and institutional groupthink led to the disastrous U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The book traces how American policymakers, driven by domestic imperatives and regional prestige, misread Saddam Hussein’s opaque and ambiguous signals.

At the same time, U.S. intelligence services, under pressure to produce definitive assessments, often projected worst-case scenarios and failed to account for the internal logic of Saddam’s decisions.

The Iraq case demonstrates how ideology, bureaucratic momentum and political agendas within Washington created a closed information system that amplified fear, sidelined diplomacy and ultimately turned flawed assumptions into a justification for war. The title “Achilles Trap” refers to the mutual entrapment of both Saddam and the U.S. in cycles of misjudgment, with neither able to correct course.

This cautionary tale is more than a retrospective. It offers a vital lens for understanding how similar institutional blind spots continue to shape American foreign policy — particularly toward Iran.

Coll’s central thesis — that Washington can become a prisoner of its own misread narratives — resonates powerfully in the context of American policy toward Iran over the past four decades. Washington’s perception of Iran has long been shaped by a framework that privileges suspicion over understanding and maximalist demands over pragmatic diplomacy.

Iran’s complex domestic politics, layered decision-making structures and rational pursuit of national security have often been reduced to a one-dimensional threat. This flattening has been reinforced by the same forces that shaped America’s approach to Iraq in the early 2000s: intelligence oversimplification, lobbying pressures and a national security culture that rewards alarmism.

To be clear, Iran is not Iraq. The two countries differ profoundly in their histories, political systems and strategic objectives. Yet a persistent bloc within the foreign policy establishment has approached Iran with a strikingly similar mindset to that which drove the Iraq War.

Intelligence is filtered through worst-case assumptions. Iran’s deterrent posture and regional behavior are interpreted not as strategic calculations, but as proof of inherent hostility. This narrow interpretive lens has distorted threat assessments and constrained diplomacy.

This is most evident in the treatment of Iran’s nuclear program. Despite years of intrusive inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency and the absence of any conclusive evidence pointing to a weaponization effort, the program continues to be portrayed in American discourse as a covert military threat. The peaceful character of Iran’s nuclear program — rooted in energy diversification, technological development and national sovereignty — has been overshadowed by worst-case assumptions amplified by political actors and lobbying networks.

To fully grasp the origins and intent behind Iran’s nuclear efforts, it is important to recall that the foundation of this program was laid not in secrecy, but in open collaboration with Western institutions. The rationale for Iran’s nuclear energy ambitions predates the 1979 revolution and enjoys a foundation in international cooperation. In fact, during the 1970s, a study conducted by Stanford Research Institute at the behest of the U.S. government strongly recommended that Iran develop an extensive civilian nuclear program to meet its future energy needs. The report projected that, despite Iran’s vast oil reserves, domestic consumption and global energy dynamics would make nuclear energy an essential component of its long-term economic stability.

Yet over the past two decades, this historical context has been all but erased from mainstream narratives. Instead, the framing has turned a manageable nuclear proliferation issue into a crisis of perception, undermining diplomacy and reinforcing a cycle of mistrust. This is not an incidental distortion. It is systemic.