From Punchline To Power: The Rise Of Iran's Security Chief Mohsen Rezaei

By Kian Sharifi

Mohsen Rezaei, a former chief commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), has returned to the center of the country's security establishment at one of the most consequential moments in its history.

After spending 16 years leading the IRGC during and after the Iran-Iraq War for most of the 1980s and nearly a quarter-century in another key state institution, Rezaei is now secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), placing him at the heart of decisions on the war, nuclear negotiations, and relations with foreign powers.

Following the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the emergence of his son Mojtaba as his successor, Rezaei's appointment gives renewed prominence to a figure whose career spans nearly the entire history of the Islamic republic.

From Anti-Shah Activist To IRGC Commander

Born in 1954 in the southwestern city of Masjed Soleyman to a Bakhtiari family, Rezaei became involved as a teenager in opposition activities against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi.

He was arrested by the shah's intelligence service, SAVAK, in the early 1970s and imprisoned in Ahvaz. He was also a member of Mansouroun, an underground Islamist militant group whose members later played a role in the formation of the revolutionary security establishment.

Following the 1979 Islamic Revolution, Rezaei became involved in establishing the IRGC, joining its central council, and participating in the drafting of its founding charter.

In September 1981, at just 27, he was appointed commander-in-chief of the IRGC by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic republic.

The IRGC Years

Rezaei commanded the IRGC from 1981 until 1997, overseeing its operations during most of the eight-year war with Iraq.

Under his leadership, the IRGC developed from a revolutionary military force into a more extensive military and security institution, expanding its organizational capabilities and influence.

Rezaei became one of the principal figures in Iran's wartime military decision-making, working alongside senior commanders and political officials, including then-President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani.

His military record, however, remains controversial.

One of the most contentious episodes concerns Operation Karbala-4, launched in December 1986. The Iranian offensive, intended to break through Iraqi defenses near Basra, ended in heavy Iranian casualties after Iraqi forces appeared to have anticipated the attack.

In 2018, Rezaei described the operation as a deception intended to prepare the ground for the subsequent Karbala-5 offensive. His remarks triggered criticism from veterans, families of those killed, and former military figures. He later clarified that Karbala-4 had initially been a genuine operation before being used to mislead Iraqi forces.

Trading Uniform For Politics

Rezaei stepped down as IRGC commander in 1997 and was succeeded by Yahya Rahim Safavi. However, his departure from the military leadership did not mark his exit from the establishment.

He was appointed by Khamenei as secretary of the Expediency Discernment Council, a state institution responsible for resolving disputes between parliament and the Guardian Council -- Iran's constitutional watchdog -- and advising on the country's broader policies.

He held the position for nearly 24 years, until 2021.

During this period, Rezaei also sought to establish himself as a national political figure. He ran for president four times, in 2005, 2009, 2013, and 2021, but never won.

Despite his longstanding position within the establishment, Rezaei struggled to build a significant electoral constituency. In the 2021 election, he received about 3.4 million votes, finishing behind eventual winner Ebrahim Raisi, who received over 18 million votes in an election that saw one of the lowest turnouts in the Islamic republic's history.

Following Raisi's election, Rezaei was appointed vice president for economic affairs, a position he held until 2023. His relatively brief tenure did little to establish him as a prominent economic policymaker, something he has long struggled with.

Back in 2015, he floated a wild strategy: If America attacked, Iran would seize 1,000 hostages in the first week and demand billions of dollars for each one. He claimed the scheme would "solve our economic problems." The idea that Iran could simply ransom its way out of financial crisis quickly became a long-running punchline.

The AMIA Bombing Allegations

At home, Rezaei has been a known figure for decades. Internationally, however, his profile is shaped by his alleged connection to the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association (AMIA) Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, which killed 85 people and injured hundreds.

Argentine prosecutors accused several senior Iranian officials of involvement in the attack, including Rezaei, who was IRGC commander at the time.

In 2007, Interpol issued a Red Notice against him and five other suspects at Argentina's request. The notice remains in force. Rezaei and Iranian authorities have denied the allegations.

The Red Notice is an international request to locate and provisionally arrest a person pending legal proceedings; it is not a conviction or an international arrest warrant.

A Return To The Security Establishment

Rezaei's return to the center of power accelerated following the killing of Ali Khamenei in US-Israeli strikes in February 2026 and the appointment of Mojtaba Khamenei by the Assembly of Experts as Iran's new supreme leader.

In March, the new supreme leader appointed Rezaei as his military adviser.

The more consequential appointments came in August. Mojtaba Khamenei named Rezaei as his representative on the SNSC. A day later, President Masud Pezeshkian appointed him secretary of the council, replacing Mohammad Bagher Zolqadr.

The SNSC coordinates Iran's defense and national security policies, bringing together senior military, political and government officials. Its decisions require the supreme leader's approval to take effect.

Although the president formally chairs the council, its secretary plays a central role in shaping its agenda, coordinating its work and overseeing the implementation of its decisions. In practice, the secretary can wield considerable operational influence, particularly when he also serves as one of the Supreme Leader's representatives on the council.

Rezaei's appointment came at a time when Iran was facing crucial decisions over the war, the Strait of Hormuz and the future of negotiations with Washington.

Rezaei's new position has quickly extended beyond domestic security coordination.

In late October, US Vice President JD Vance sent him a letter seeking to explore the possibility of restarting negotiations with Iran. Vance reportedly stressed that any diplomatic process would have to address Tehran's nuclear program.

The choice of recipient raised eyebrows. Rather than addressing the letter to Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, who had emerged as Iran's principal negotiator during the war, Washington contacted Rezaei, who has a direct institutional link to Mojtaba Khamenei.

Rezaei also emerged as a central figure in Tehran's nuclear diplomacy, with the issue increasingly being handled within the framework of the SNSC.

His international engagement extended to Moscow. After a telephone conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin, Rezaei travelled to Moscow on November 5, delivering a message from the supreme leader and discussing regional security and bilateral cooperation.

Rezaei Versus Qalibaf

Rezaei's rise has raised questions about the standing of Qalibaf, who became one of Iran's most prominent political figures during the early stages of the war.

The two men share a military background, although Rezaei belongs to an older generation of IRGC commanders. He was the force's commander-in-chief when Qalibaf was advancing through its ranks.

Qalibaf retains his position as parliament speaker and his role in leading Iran's negotiating delegation in talks with the United States over ending the war, now in its ninth month. But Rezaei's appointment has given him a separate channel of authority, particularly in coordinating security policy and communicating with the supreme leader.

Hamidreza Azizi of Crisis Group told RFE/RL's Radio Farda that Rezaei was propped up by people close to Mojtaba Khamenei who were not happy with Qalibaf's handling of the negotiations, and they wanted someone who could bring various groups together, especially the military.

Rezaei's return therefore points to the growing importance of the security establishment in shaping Iran's political and diplomatic direction during wartime.

Whether he will become the country's principal strategic decision-maker remains unclear. But after decades of moving between military command, political institutions and government, Rezaei has once again secured a position at the center of the Islamic republic's power structure.

With reporting by Saeid Jafari of RFE/RL's Radio Farda

• Kian Sharifi

  Kian Sharifi is a feature writer specializing in Iranian affairs in RFE/RL's Central Newsroom in Prague. He got his start in journalism at the Financial Tribune, an English-language newspaper published in Tehran, where he worked as an editor. He then moved to BBC Monitoring, where he led a team of journalists who closely watched media trends and analyzed key developments in Iran and the wider region.